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T

how members of a terrorist organization should be categorized under international law
when the organization is engaged in an armed conflict
with a nation. In particular, the essay discusses whether
these members can properly be categorized as a type of “combatant”
or whether they must instead always be categorized as “civilians.”
The proper categorization can have significant implications for the
nation’s authority under international law (and potentially also domestic law) to subject members of a terrorist organization to military targeting and detention. The United States and Israel currently
have different legal approaches to the question, and the essay will
explore and comment on these differences.1

T

HIS ESSAY CONSIDERS

BACKGROUND

he usual starting point for thinking about the proper categorization of individuals involved in an armed conflict are the four
Geneva Conventions that were negotiated shortly after World
†
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I am assuming here, as have U.S. and Israeli courts, that an armed conflict can
exist under certain circumstances between a nation and a non-state terrorist organization. See also, e.g., Derek Jinks, September 11 and the Laws of War, 28 YALE J.
INT’L L. 1, 9 (2003).
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War II. The Third Geneva Convention, which governs the treatment of prisoners of war, and the Fourth Geneva Convention,
which governs the treatment of civilians during wartime, are especially relevant. Both the United States and Israel ratified the Conventions in the 1950s. There are also two Additional Protocols to
the Conventions that were negotiated in the 1970s. Although neither the United States nor Israel is a party to the Protocols, some
provisions in the Protocols may reflect customary international law
that is binding on non-parties.
According to many international law commentators, the Geneva
Conventions allow for only two categories: lawful combatants, and
civilians. Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention states that prisoner of war (POW) protections apply to both the armed forces of a
party to the Convention, as well as to a party’s militia or other volunteer corps if they meet four conditions: they must be “commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates”; have a “fixed
distinctive sign recognizable at a distance”; carry their arms openly;
and conduct their operations “in accordance with the laws and customs of war.” Those who argue that there are only two categories
contend that anyone engaged in combat who does not qualify as a
POW – in other words, anyone who is not a lawful combatant – is
a civilian, and their treatment is regulated by the Fourth Geneva
Convention.2
Not surprisingly, the standards for military targeting and detention differ between the categories of lawful combatants and civilians. For lawful combatants, a nation may target all members of the
enemy’s armed forces (except medical and religious personnel),
regardless of whether they happen to be participating in hostilities
at the time of targeting. In addition, the nation may capture and
detain all members of the armed forces until the end of hostilities,
without any individualized showing of necessity. International law
thus allows for a membership-based approach to the targeting and
2

See, e.g., ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 409-10 (2d ed. 2005); Knut
Dormann, The Legal Situation of “Unlawful/Unprivileged Combatants,” 85 INT’L REV.
RED CROSS 45 (2003); Ryan Goodman, The Detention of Civilians in Armed Conflict,
103 AM. J. INT’L L. 48 (2009).
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detention of lawful combatants. Civilians, by contrast, may be subjected to military targeting only “for such time as they take a direct
part in hostilities.”3 As for detention, civilians may be “interned”
without trial “only if the security of the Detaining Power makes it
absolutely necessary,” and the internee must be released “as soon as
the reasons which necessitated his internment no longer exist.”4

B

THE U.S. & ISRAELI APPROACHES

oth the United States and Israel have had to confront the question of how to categorize members of a terrorist organization,
but their legal approaches have differed. After the September 11,
2001 attacks, the United States categorized members of the Al
Qaeda terrorist organization as “unlawful combatants,” and the
United States claimed that this categorization meant (among other
things) that members of the organization could be subjected to military targeting and detention just like more traditional combatants,
except that they were not entitled to the protections accorded to
POWs under international law (such as immunity from prosecution
for their combat activities). The United States thus contested the
claim that anyone who does not qualify as a POW is automatically a
civilian. According to the U.S. position, there are three categories
in international humanitarian law rather than two: lawful combatants, unlawful combatants, and civilians.5
Despite imposing certain procedural restrictions on the government, U.S. courts have so far accepted this three-category approach. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, for example, a plurality of the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he capture and detention of lawful
3
4

5

First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, art. 51(3).
Fourth Geneva Convention, arts. 42, 132; see also id. at art. 78 (allowing occupying power to subject civilians to assigned residence or internment for “imperative
reasons of security,” subject to a right of appeal and periodic review).
Alternatively, but to the same effect, the U.S. position could be characterized as
recognizing two general categories – combatants and civilians – and as classifying
unlawful combatants as a sub-group of the first category. The key point is that the
U.S. position treats unlawful combatants as distinguishable from both lawful
combatants and civilians.
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combatants and the capture, detention, and trial of unlawful combatants,
by ‘universal agreement and practice,’ are ‘important incident[s] of
war.’”6 This detention authority, the plurality further explained,
lasts for “the duration of the relevant conflict.”7 Similarly, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, despite invalidating on statutory grounds the military commission trial system that the Bush Administration had set
up at Guantanamo, the Court made clear that it viewed the conflict
between the United States and Al Qaeda as an “armed conflict” under international law, and the Court said that “[the petitioner] does
not challenge, and we do not today address, the Government’s
power to detain him for the duration of active hostilities.”8
In addition, although the Obama Administration has announced
that it does not intend to use the term “enemy combatants” in defending its military detention policy, this labeling change appears
limited to domestic constitutional issues rather than international
law issues, and the Administration has continued to claim the right
under international law to treat members of Al Qaeda as combatants rather than civilians. Thus, the Administration has argued that
“Article 4 [of the Third Geneva Convention] does not purport to
define all detainable persons in armed conflict” and instead simply
“defines certain categories of persons entitled to prisoner-of-war
treatment.”9 A contrary conclusion, the Administration has contended, “would improperly reward an enemy that violates the laws
of war by operating as a loose network and camouflaging its forces
as civilians.”10
6

542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (plurality) (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28,
30 (1942)).
7
Id. at 526.
8
548 U.S. 557, 635 (2006).
9
Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority
Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay (March 13, 2009), at 8, In re
Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation (D.D.C.), available at www.usdoj.gov/
opa/documents/memo-re-det-auth.pdf.
10
Id. For recent decisions accepting this argument, see Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F.
Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. 2009); Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C.
2009).
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By contrast, the Israeli Supreme Court has endorsed the twocategory approach. In its December 2006 decision in Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, the court considered
the legality of Israel’s policy of targeted killing of members of terrorist organizations involved in the planning, launching, or execution of terrorist attacks against Israel.11 In rejecting the Israeli government’s argument that the court should recognize an “unlawful
combatant” category under international law, the court concluded
that “the data before us are not sufficient to recognize this third
category.” The court then proceeded to consider the circumstances
under which civilians may be subjected to targeted killings. In its
June 2008 decision in A. v. State of Israel, the court addressed the
legality of Israel’s terrorist detention law, and it once again purported to apply a two-category approach.12 Although Israel’s detention statute specifically refers to “unlawful combatants,” the court
concluded that, under international law, individuals falling into that
classification are simply within a sub-group of the category of civilians. The court then proceeded to consider the circumstances under
which civilians may be detained.

PROBLEMS WITH THE TWO-CATEGORY APPROACH

A

lthough the two-category approach has substantial support
among international law commentators, there are a number of
reasons to question it. First, this approach may create perverse incentives. One of the central purposes of the laws of war is to encourage fighters both to distinguish themselves from civilians and to
avoid attacking civilians. Under the two-category approach, however, a nation engaged in an armed conflict has less ability to target
and detain fighters who fail to wear uniforms or who purposefully
target civilians than if those fighters observe the principles of distinction. The two-category approach thus seems to reward the very
11

HCJ 769/02 (IsrSC 2006), available at elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG/02/690/
007/a34/02007690.a34.pdf.
12
CrimA 3261/08 (IsrSC 2008), available at elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/06/
590/066/n04/06066590.n04.pdf.
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conduct that the laws of war are designed to prevent.13
Second, the conception of “civilians” in the Geneva Conventions
does not fit well with the reality of an armed conflict with a terrorist organization. While the Conventions envision that civilians
might sometimes take part in hostilities, they envision that this
combatancy is a temporary deviation for these individuals, and that
there is some separate group of full-time fighters. For a terrorist
organization engaged in an armed conflict with a nation, however,
the involvement of the members of such an organization in hostilities is not some temporary deviation from their normal circumstances. Thus, the time between terrorist attacks does not constitute a reversion to non-combatancy – rather, that time is simply
part of the planning and waiting associated with the terrorism itself.
Nor is there any separate set of full-time fighters – the members of
the terrorist organization are themselves the full-time fighters.
Third, if members of a terrorist organization are considered to
be civilians and thus immune from targeting except when directly
participating in hostilities, it may be difficult to stop them from
moving in and out of hostilities – the so-called “revolving door”
problem.14 The members of a terrorist organization thus may “enjoy
the best of both worlds – they can remain civilians most of the time
and only endanger their protection as civilians while actually in the
process of carrying out a terrorist act.”15 For example, the two13

This problem would be exacerbated if, as the U.S. government and some commentators have maintained, the four requirements in Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention apply even to regular armed forces. See, e.g., INGRID DETTER,
THE LAW OF WAR 136-37 (2d ed. 2000); John C. Yoo & James C. Ho, The Status
of Terrorists, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 207, 225 (2003). If so, a nation that decided to
stop having its regular armed forces wear uniforms would thereby make it harder
under the two-category approach for those forces to be targeted and detained,
turning the usual assumptions of international humanitarian law on their head.
14
See, e.g., Richard D. Rosen, Targeting Enemy Forces in the War on Terror: Preserving
Civilian Immunity, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 683, 738-41 (2009) (discussing this
problem); W. Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 A.F. L. REV. 1, 117-20
(1990) (same).
15
David Kretzmer, Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or
Legitimate Means of Defence?, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 171, 193 (2005).
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category approach might mean that Al Qaeda military recruits training in Afghanistan could not be targeted because they are not lawful
combatants and have not yet directly participated in hostilities. To
take an even more extreme example, the two-category approach
might mean that, after the September 11 attacks, the United States
lacked the power to target Osama bin Laden, because he was no
longer directly participating in hostilities.16
Finally, the two-category approach threatens to undermine a nation’s inherent right of self-defense. Both the UN Security Council
and NATO appeared to recognize after the September 11 attacks
that a nation’s right of self-defense can be triggered, at least in some
instances, by terrorist attacks.17 But once the attack is over, the
two-category approach seems to suggest that the attackers are no
longer subject to a counter-attack because they are no longer directly participating in hostilities, thereby substantially reducing the
value of the right of self-defense. As one commentator notes, under
the two-category approach “the right of self-defence under Article
51 of the UN Charter following an armed attack by a terrorist
group may become meaningless.”18

W

TEXT OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS

e might need to accept these problematic consequences if
the two-category approach were mandated by the relevant
text of the Geneva Conventions, but it is not. In the four original
Geneva Conventions, the strongest textual argument for the twocategory approach comes from Article 4 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. That Article states that those who find themselves in the
hands of a party to an armed conflict or an occupying power are
“protected persons” covered by the Fourth Geneva Convention
(that is, civilians). It then carves out from its coverage persons covered by the other Geneva Conventions, including POWs. The nega16

See R. J. Delahunty, Is the Geneva POW Convention “Quaint”?, 33 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1635, 1654 (2007).
17
See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Constitutional Validity of Military
Commissions, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 249, 257 (2002).
18
Kretzmer, supra note 15, at 193.
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tive implication, the argument goes, is that if someone does not fall
within the protections of the other Conventions, they are covered
by the Fourth Geneva Convention as a civilian.
This textual argument does not work, however, in the context
of a conflict against a terrorist organization, for two reasons. First,
most of the Fourth Geneva Convention, including Article 4, applies
only to armed conflicts between parties to the Convention and
situations of military occupation in the territory of a party, and thus
does not apply to a conflict between a party and a non-state terrorist organization. Second, Article 4 also carves out from its coverage
individuals from states that have normal diplomatic relations with
the detaining nation, something that will often be the case for
members of a terrorist organization – it is generally the case, for
example, in the conflict between the United States and Al Qaeda.19
The textual argument is also undercut by Common Article 3 of
the Geneva Conventions, which regulates “non-international”
armed conflicts. The two-category approach would suggest that
everyone who fights in a non-international armed conflict (such as a
civil war) is a civilian, since the POW provisions in the Third Geneva Convention apply only to conflicts between nations. Common
Article 3, however, expressly envisions the detention of enemy
armed forces: it states that its protections extend to persons, including “members of armed forces,” who have been taken out of
combat for any reason, including “detention.” State practice since
the adoption of the Geneva Conventions also provides many instances in which combatant detention frameworks have been used
during non-international armed conflicts.20 Moreover, even the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has recently acknowledged that members of an organized armed group engaged in
a non-international armed conflict can be considered combatants
rather than civilians.21
19

Accord George H. Aldrich, The Taliban, Al Qaeda, and the Determination of Illegal
Combatants, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 891, 893 n.12 (2002).
20
See Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and
Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1086 (2008).
21
See ICRC, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities
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Provisions in the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions also appear to assume a third category. For example, Article 75 refers to individuals “in the power of a Party to the conflict”
who are not entitled to the protections of the Conventions, and
Article 45 provides that “[a]ny person who has taken part in hostilities, who is not entitled to prisoner-of-war status and who does not
benefit from more favourable treatment in accordance with the
Fourth Convention shall have the right at all times to the protection
of Article 75 of this Protocol.” These provisions seem clearly to
envision that there will be individuals who are neither lawful combatants nor civilians.

A

STRETCHING THE CIVILIAN CATEGORY

t least some of the problems associated with the two-category
approach can be addressed by broadly interpreting the authority of a state to target and detain civilians, and this is essentially the
path taken by the Israeli Supreme Court. In the Public Committee
Against Torture decision, the court broadly interpreted the circumstances under which a member of a terrorist organization should be
viewed as directly participating in hostilities and thus subject to targeting. Among other things, the court reasoned that this concept
includes persons who plan and direct hostile actions as well as those
who carry them out, and that those involved in ongoing terrorist
activities are subject to targeting even during the time in between
hostile acts. In the A. v. State of Israel decision, the court held that
members of a terrorist organization can be subjected to administrative detention even if they have not participated in hostilities, as
long as they have “made a significant contribution to the cycle of
hostilities in its broad sense.” Applied aggressively, these standards
come close to treating active members of a terrorist organization as
equivalent to enemy armed forces in a traditional armed conflict,
without the benefit of POW protections – that is, they come close
to what is allowed under the three-category approach.
Under International Humanitarian Law at 28-32 (2009), at www.icrc.org/Web/
eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/direct-participation-ihl-article-020609/$File/directparticipation-guidance-2009-ICRC.pdf.
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While avoiding some of the anomalies discussed above, this
stretching of the two-category approach has its own potential drawbacks. In particular, it poses the danger of undermining the protections of true non-combatants in more traditional conflicts – by, for
example, exposing to military attack civilians suspected of conspiring with or giving support to the enemy. The protection of such
non-combatants is one of the “cardinal principles” of modern international humanitarian law.22 If concepts such as “direct participation” are expanded to accommodate the unique features of an
armed conflict with a terrorist organization, this protection may be
eroded.
This stretching is also likely to put the nation at odds with widespread views among international lawyers about the scope of military authority vis-à-vis civilians. Many commentators have a narrow
view of concepts such as “direct participation in hostilities.”23 This
leaves a nation like Israel vulnerable to significant legal criticism for
its targeted killing and detention policies.24 Moreover, even after
stretching the civilian category, a nation faced with an ongoing conflict with a terrorist organization may still find it necessary to deviate from the two-category approach. Many commentators in fact
accuse Israel of doing precisely that – for example, in connection
with military operations against Hamas in Gaza.25 To take another
example, it may be difficult to reconcile some of the U.S. Predator
drone attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan (a practice continued by
the Obama Administration) with the two-category approach, since
22

Advisory Opinion, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons ¶ 78 (ICJ July 8,
1996), available at www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/7495.pdf.
23
See, e.g., HELEN DUFFY, THE “WAR ON TERROR” AND THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 230 (2005) (“Direct participation should be narrowly construed, and does not include for example support for, or affiliation to, the adversary.”); Yael Stein, By Any Name Illegal and Immoral: Response to “Israel’s Policy of
Targeted Killing”, 17 ETHICS & INT’L AFFAIRS J. 127, 129 (2003) (arguing that “as
soon as [civilians] cease [engaging in hostilities] they regain protection”).
24
See, e.g., Kristen E. Eichensehr, On Target? The Israeli Supreme Court and the Expansion of Targeted Killings, 116 YALE L.J. 1873 (2007).
25
See, e.g., David Luban, Was the Gaza Campaign Legal?, 31 ABA NAT’L SEC. LAW
REPORT 2, 5-6 (Jan./Feb. 2009).
406

12 GREEN BAG 2D

The U.S., Israel & Unlawful Combatants
many of the targets are not participating in hostilities at the time
they are attacked.
One potential advantage of insisting on the two-category approach is that it seems to be more grounded in existing treaties –
namely, the Geneva Conventions – and thus more respectful of international law. It is at least debatable, however, which is more respectful: stretching existing treaties in ways that many people find
problematic, or acknowledging that the treaties have some limitations and that a new framework needs to be developed. As noted
below, if done in a way that builds upon the agreed-upon principles
in the treaties, the three-category approach may do more to promote international law than the two-category approach. Moreover,
by acknowledging that the existing categories of lawful combatants
and civilians do not answer the hard questions, a nation is likely to
expose itself to greater scrutiny, and thus potentially more accountability, than if it purports to be operating under preexisting rules.

T

LEGAL BLACK HOLE?

his takes us back to the three-category approach followed by
the United States. This approach, too, is highly controversial.
The biggest drawback to this approach is the possibility that it will
result in a “legal black hole.” If members of a terrorist organization
are neither POWs nor civilians, there is a danger that they might
not have any legal protection at all. Some observers would cite
abuses of terrorist detainees during the Bush Administration as confirmation of this danger. A related danger is that individuals with
only tenuous connections to terrorism might be subject to targeting
and detention; if so, this could itself seriously undermine the protection of civilians under international law. This overbreadth concern was highlighted by the alarming suggestion of a U.S. government lawyer in one case that even a “little old lady in Switzerland”
who contributed money to a charity that turned out to support Al
Qaeda could be held as a combatant.26
26

See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 475 (D.D.C. 2005),
vacated sub nom. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), rev’d, 128 S.
Ct. 2229 (2008).
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As an initial matter, it is important to remember that the machinery for enforcing international law in this area is limited and
highly dependent on domestic institutions. As a result, the danger
of a legal black hole is likely to depend much more on the good faith
of the nation involved, its sensitivity to international opinion, and
its internal checks and balances than on the particular legal categorizations. Moreover, in a nation with a strong court system, which is
true of both the United States and Israel, the government will likely
need to sell its approach to the judiciary, and a legal black hole will
not be acceptable to courts, something that became apparent during
the Bush Administration.
In any event, there is nothing inherent in the three-category approach that leads to a legal black hole or undue overbreadth. Today
there is general agreement, for example, that the protections listed
in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions apply in this context, at least as a matter of customary international law. These protections would guarantee minimum standards of humane treatment,
such as protection from torture and a requirement of basic due
process for criminal prosecution. The U.S. Supreme Court has in
fact held that Common Article 3 applies to the conflict between the
United States and Al Qaeda.27 Many commentators also regard Article 75 of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions
(which contains a more extensive list of minimum protections) as
reflecting customary international law. Some human rights treaties,
such as the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, will also likely apply and
provide protections.
In addition, because a nation’s authority to target and detain terrorists draws support from the international laws of war governing
more traditional conflicts, the framework of those laws could be
applied in a way that would impose genuine limitations. Thus, for
example, in discerning who can be subjected to targeting and detention as unlawful combatants, an adjudicator might require as a prerequisite to combatant status that the individuals have attributes that
27

See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 630-31.
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make them functionally analogous to traditional armed forces. As
Jack Goldsmith and I have argued, “terrorist organizations do have
leadership and command structures, however diffuse, and persons
who receive and execute orders within this command structure are
analogous to combatants” in more traditional armed conflicts.28
Such a “command structure” test would exclude “the little old lady
in Switzerland” and other problematic examples from the combatant category.29 Importantly, the ICRC has recently moved in this
direction, suggesting that those members of an organized armed
group who have a “continuous combat function” can be considered
combatants rather than civilians.30
Similarly, in discerning the appropriate length of detention, it
may be appropriate to require a more individualized assessment of
dangerousness than is required in more traditional armed conflicts.
During a traditional conflict, enemy forces may be held until the
end of active hostilities, and detention decisions are made on a
class-wide basis. The operating assumptions are that detention is
justified as a result of the danger that able-bodied enemy armed
forces will return to the fight (perhaps even with the compulsion of
their state), and that the detainees will be released once that danger
has passed (due, for example, to a surrender by their government).
In a conflict with a terrorist organization, however, detainees have
no state obligation to return to hostilities if released, and their personal commitment to engage in such hostilities is likely to vary
widely. Designation errors are also likely to be more common in
this context, given the lack of uniforms and the lack of affiliation
with an enemy state. Moreover, the conflict cannot be ended
28

Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on
Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2114-15 (2005).
29
See Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 68-69 (applying this test and concluding that
“[s]ympathizers, propagandists, and financiers who have no involvement with this
‘command structure,’ while perhaps members of the enemy organization in an
abstract sense, cannot be considered part of the enemy’s ‘armed forces’ and
therefore cannot be detained militarily unless they take a direct part in the hostilities”).
30
See ICRC, Interpretive Guidance, supra note 21, at 33-34.
SUMMER 2009

409

Curtis A. Bradley
through the defeat or surrender of a state and thus may last indefinitely, perhaps even for the detainee’s lifetime. In this context,
therefore, a regular, individualized assessment of the dangerousness
of a detainee may be necessary.31 In other words, the assessment of
whether hostilities are still ongoing would be made with respect to
the particular detainee rather than on a class-wide basis.
The U.S. government began moving towards such an individualized perspective on the end of hostilities in 2004, with the establishment at Guantanamo of Administrative Review Boards, which
make yearly assessments of whether the detainees continue to pose
a threat.32 Through this process as well as other mechanisms, hundreds of detainees have been repatriated or released from Guantanamo, and an individualized assessment of the detainees is continuing under an Executive Order issued by President Obama.33
The federal district court in D.C. recently made such an individualized perspective even more mandatory.34
Finally, it is analytically useful to separate the question of categorization from the question of process. To recognize a third category does not tell us what process is required in order to determine
whether someone falls into that category (or the institutions that
should administer this process). In light of the higher risk of misidentification and the potentially longer duration of detention, there
may be strong arguments for requiring substantially more process in
an armed conflict with a terrorist organization than in a more tradi31

See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 28, at 2124-26; see also John B. Bellinger, III,
“Prisoners in War: Contemporary Challenges to the Geneva Conventions” (Dec.
10, 2007), at www.usembassy.org.uk/ukpapress72.html.
32
See, e.g., Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, at www.
defenselink.mil/news/Aug2006/d20060809ARBProceduresMemo.pdf.
33
See Executive Order – Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained at the
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base and Closure of Detention Facilities (Jan. 22, 2009),
at www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/ClosureOfGuantanamoDetentionFacilities/.
34
See Basardh v. Obama, 612 F. Supp. 2d 30, 35 (D.D.C. 2009) (ordering release
of detainee based on evidence suggesting that “any ties with the enemy have been
severed, and any realistic risk that he could rejoin the enemy has been foreclosed”).
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tional conflict.35 This emphasis on the need for sufficient process has
in fact been the dominant theme of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in the area since the September 11 attacks. While process considerations are most obviously relevant to detention decisions, additional process might also be warranted with respect to targeting
decisions, at least after the fact.

A

CONCLUSION

lthough the two-category approach might seem at first glance
to be the most protective approach for civil liberties, it is not
clear that this is the case with respect to an armed conflict between
a nation and a terrorist organization. If such a conflict is pushed into
the civilian category, it is very likely that this category will be
stretched in order to accommodate the security needs of the nation.
The net result may be a reduction in protection for true noncombatants. While the three-category approach is less anchored in
existing treaties than the two-category approach, it allows for a
more realistic description of how members of a terrorist organization operate. Moreover, depending on how it is defined, the third
category could contain significant substantive and procedural protections that are similar to those available under the two-category
approach.

35

See generally Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 28, at 2121-23; see also Matthew C.
Waxman, Detention as Targeting: Standards of Certainty and Detention of Suspected
Terrorists, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1365 (2008) (discussing standards of certainty to
be applied to detention decisions).
SUMMER 2009

411

